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Abstract This paper argues that some women in developing countries use domestic
labor as a tool to incentivize husbands. A theoretical model is derived based on the
traditions of rural Malawi, where men often supplement farm income with wage
labor. As wage labor is not observed by the wife, this creates moral hazard: husbands
may not make enough effort to bring home wages. The model predicts that women
overcome this by using domestic labor as an incentive device: they increase their
domestic labor and reduce their leisure in response to good consumption outcomes,
but only if they cannot rely on divorce threat as an alternative source of incentives.
This prediction is conﬁrmed using survey data from Malawi. Identiﬁcation is based
on the fact that Malawi’s kinship traditions exogenously determine women’s
accessibility to divorce. Where divorce is not an option, women make inefﬁcient
labor choices in order to provide incentives.
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1 Introduction
In developing countries, women continue to specialize in domestic labor in house-
holds. This specialization has traditionally been considered a burden for women,
primarily because it reduces their earnings power, which may reduce their power
within marriage. However, women may use this specialization to their advantage,
particularly when divorce is not a credible threat. The question I address in this paper
is the following: do women use domestic labor as leverage to inﬂuence their hus-
bands’ actions in their favor, particularly when their outside options
are low?1 I structure a model of moral hazard in marriage based on the family
institutions of Malawi, where exogenous kinship traditions imply that wives can
divorce easily in some areas, but not others. Wives provide their husbands with
incentives to invest effort in generating consumption. The model predicts that women
with low outside options who cannot credibly threaten their husbands with divorce
implement more stringent incentives through domestic labor than women who have
high outside options and hence can credibly threaten with divorce. This prediction is
conﬁrmed in the data: where divorce is inaccessible, women make inefﬁcient time
allocation choices to generate incentives.
Becker’s (1973, 1974) seminal contribution to our economic understanding of
marriage rests on the idea that marriage takes place when there is a surplus to be
gained for the two individuals, relative to staying single. Specialization within the
household is an important driver of this surplus; this has traditionally involved
women specializing in domestic production, and men specializing in market labor
supply. However, this can lead to inefﬁciencies, if men cannot commit to compen-
sating their wives for staying at home. For example, Cohen (1987) argues that
marriage is a type of contract, with each spouse having expectations of a set of
services that their partner will provide them with. At the same time, marriage is an
incomplete contract; problems can arise when the inability to commit leads to
inefﬁciently low investments, for example (Grossbard-Schechtman and Lemennicier
1999). A second problem arises because of the inherent lack of full information in
marriage, as a result of which the effort spent generating marital goods, such
as joint earnings, may be unobservable. This problem is exacerbated in developing
countries, where women’s low autonomy results in less inﬂuence within marriage.
Divorce may be an empowering strategy that helps to overcome this problem
(Cohen 1971; Reniers 2003). The threat of divorce forces husbands to involve their
wives in decisions and to provide for them. However, divorce can be inaccessible to
women, particularly if it makes them economically insecure or socially ostracized. If
divorce is not a credible threat, a fundamental moral hazard problem in marriage
remains.
I hypothesize that wives address this problem by using domestic labor as an
incentive device. England and Folbre (2002) emphasize the role that marriage-spe-
ciﬁc resources, such as household work and affection, can play as sources of bar-
gaining power if they can be credibly withheld. In cultures where men have ofﬁcial
authority over women, women may hold “unassigned” power through the ability to
withhold food and sexual services (Lamphere 1974, p. 99). Cohen’s (1971) study of
1 In this paper, I deﬁne an outside option to be the utility of a husband or wife if divorced.
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the patrilineal Kanuri in Bornu, for example, demonstrated that control of the
household sphere was the main way in which women derived control in other spheres
of marital life. The key to the effectiveness of this mechanism is specialization,
which implies that a woman’s labor cannot be easily replaced.
In this paper, I model the behavior of spouses in rural Malawi. Existing intra-
household models are inadequate for capturing the potential for within-household
sources of bargaining power. Bargaining and collective intra-household models
(Manser and Brown 1980; Chiappori 1988) postulate that a woman’s power within
marriage is determined primarily by her outside option. Other models of the
household have discussed within-marriage threat points (Lundberg and Pollak 1993)
and the consequences of limited commitment on efﬁciency in marriage (Aura 2002;
Lundberg and Pollak 2001; Rasul 2008). However, the use of incentives to generate
desirable outcomes has not been addressed.
I propose a model in which wives use a combination of domestic labor and
divorce threat to incentivize husbands because of a moral hazard problem.
Wives observe the amount of income a husband brings home, which is a noisy signal
of how much effort he has made to contribute to the household. They respond
positively to a high amount and negatively otherwise. In order to test the model,
I take advantage of the fact that kinship in Malawi, which is exogenously
determined at birth, has a strong inﬂuence on divorce accessibility. This is because it
determines the pattern of land inheritance that a household follows. As a
result, the effect of divorce accessibility on behavior can be neatly compared through
kinship.
In rural Malawi, there are two distinct kinship traditions. Most of Malawi is
matrilineal: inheritance passes through the mother’s line and matrilocality is
common, where a married couple resides in the wife’s natal village. The remainder of
Malawi is patrilineal, where inheritance passes from father to son and patrilo-
cality is common. Under matriliny, women’s outside options are high because
they own household land and have the support of their kin.2 As a result, divorce is a
credible threat. In contrast, divorce is not a credible threat for patrilineal
women who lose access to land on divorce. The model predicts that patrilineal
women use domestic labor as a stronger incentive device than matrilineal
women. The model is tested on wives’ time use in Malawi: the results conﬁrm the
prediction.
The theoretical framework of this paper is related to the literature on asymmetric
information, active incentives and domestic labor in marriage. Most of the
current household economics literature focuses on Pareto efﬁcient outcomes
(Chiappori 1988; Lundberg and Pollak 1993), which are not supported by data on
productive activities (Udry 1996). This motivates asymmetric information
in marriage in this paper, which has already received some attention in the literature
(Peters 1986; Friedberg and Stern 2014). Souza (2013) builds a moral hazard
model of the family where the elderly provide the young with incentives to
exert effort in the labor market, while Rasul (2008) demonstrates that bargaining over
2 Although matriliny strictly implies that land passes from a brother to his sister’s son (thus travelling
through the lineage of the female, but never owned by her), in Malawi in practise matrilineal traditions
have evolved so that women own land. Under patriliny, women rarely own land.
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fertility can lead to inefﬁcient outcomes due to the inability of spouses to commit to
future actions. Active incentives are modelled by Landes (1978),
who explores the role of alimony as an enforcement mechanism for optimal marital
investment. Domestic labor as a source of power is addressed by Pollak (2005)
through its effect on the outside option rather than its use as a leverage device. This
paper models and tests the existence of domestic labor as an incentive device to
overcome asymmetric information in marriage.3
The use of domestic labor in the model is similar to the concept of “wife-services”
in Grossbard (1976, p. 703), whereby in a society with extremely traditional gender
roles, women provide domestic goods, and hence supply domestic labor, while men
demand women’s domestic labor, and compensate them for it. As in a standard labor
supply model, the shadow wage is determined by the productivity of the wife, so that
more able women will have a leftward shifted supply curve of domestic goods,
because they demand a higher shadow wage than less able women. Interpreting the
moral hazard model along the lines of Grossbard’s model implies that women in
Malawi supply domestic labor and are compensated by men with cash goods, such as
clothing. In addition, productivity differences may affect the total amount of
domestic labor supplied.
This paper offers important policy implications relating to female empowerment.
Domestic specialization can be empowering for women, especially when their
autonomy is otherwise low. However, using domestic labor as an incentive device
prevents an efﬁcient allocation of time. Accessible divorce is also empowering and
may reduce the need for sources of power internal to marriage. Therefore, empow-
ering women by making divorce more accessible can reduce inefﬁciencies in
women’s time allocation. One way of empowering women in developing countries is
to grant them land rights.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents
some anthropological evidence on Malawi that is relevant to the paper. The theo-
retical model of marriage is presented in Section 3. Empirical tests are in
Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Life in rural Malawi
2.1 The agricultural year
Around 90 % of all employees in Malawi work in the agricultural sector (Bignami-
Van Assche et al. 2011). Most of these are involved in smallholder production with
land plots under 3 hectares (Ellis et al. 2003). Due to the importance of agriculture for
most of the Malawi population, labor is a key asset for household production (Phiri
3 There have been several empirical studies on female empowerment in developing countries (e.g.,
Anderson and Eswaran 2009); however, this is to the author’s best knowledge the ﬁrst paper to show
empirically the use of domestic production as an active incentive device. Related to the present paper,
Reniers (2003) shows that divorce can be an empowering strategy in Malawi while Alfano et al. (2011)
observe that household-level sources of power are more important for women living in Indian states with
low rather than high institutional female autonomy. This is a similar idea to this paper, as institutional
autonomy encompasses divorce accessibility.
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1985). Most households combine farming, wage labor and small business to earn
their livelihoods (Kerr 2005a).
The agricultural year in Malawi begins in October with the rainy season. The rainy
season lasts from October until March, during which maize is grown as the primary
subsistence crop (Takane 2008; Ellis et al. 2003). The dry season lasts from April
until September. During the dry season, households consume the maize they have
grown and engage in other, primarily non-agricultural, income-earning opportunities
(Kerr 2005b).
2.2 Division of labor and cash income
The division of labor in Malawi is strongly regimented by culture and tradition. The
primary use of households’ labor is for subsistence production.4 The labor for the
main crop, maize, is either shared or predominantly carried out by women (Spring
1995; Kerr 2005a; Hirschmann and Vaughan 1983). Short-term, off-farm labor
opportunities are available throughout the year. Short-term work in the dry season
usually involves tasks such as brick-making or vegetable gardening (Kerr 2005b).5
Men are responsible for generating this cash income for non-food necessities, such as
clothing, salt and soap (Bignami-Van Assche et al. 2011). Women carry out a
substantial amount of wage labor only when they are unmarried or their husbands do
not contribute to the household. Spring (1995) also notes that households are
becoming increasingly reliant on husbands bringing in income from outside
opportunities.
The husband’s cash-generating labor is off-farm and thus unobservable from
the wife’s perspective. Additional uncertainty arises because employers renegotiate
agreed wages in the face of agricultural shocks (Takane 2008) or because
wives do not know the earnings of the husband, giving husbands scope to conceal the
true amount. In 42 % of households studied by Kerr (2005a), wives did not
know their husband’s income. Often, husbands would not contribute their
cash and would instead spend it on consumption goods such as alcohol, which
was a growing problem in the region. There is a moral hazard problem: as husbands’
cash-generating labor is unobservable to wives and husbands have to share their
income, they have an incentive to under-invest effort from the perspective of the
household.
Women are responsible for the domestic sphere of the household. Spring (1995)
documents that women spend an equal number of hours on the farm and in
domestic activities, ﬁnishing their domestic tasks before or after farm work. Activ-
ities include childcare, cooking, cleaning and fetching water and ﬁrewood. Men
spend around two-thirds less time than their wives on domestic work; in addition,
their domestic activity appears to primarily consist of house building and repair
(Spring 1995).
4 The predominant crop grown is maize, although some households grow cassava and rice as food sources
(Spring 1995). Good health is particularly important for the ability to carry out agricultural labor (Engberg
et al. 1987).
5 These are not in conﬂict with own-farm agricultural production and are not normally an indicator of food
insecurity. Instead, they are used to bring additional income to the household.
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Husbands have more leisure time than their wives, particularly in the dry season
when off-farm income earning is not immediately necessary for the survival of the
household (Kerr 2005a). Wives’ domestic duties continue throughout the dry season,
so that wives have to rise earlier than husbands to tend to domestic chores (Kerr
2005a). On the whole, Kerr (2005a) ﬁnds that most of the wives’ tasks are year-
round, whereas this is less the case for men. These observations suggest that during
the dry season, husbands have the capacity to work more hours than they choose to.
Indeed, wives in Kerr’s (2005a) study frequently complained of low labor con-
tributions of husbands towards the household. This suggests that husbands’ cost of
effort is high.
2.3 Kinship traditions
A crucial factor that affects intra-household behavior in Malawi is kinship, which is
determined by the tribe a person is born into and is thus exogenous. Tribes are either
patrilineal or matrilineal.6 The distinction is a function of many intricate rules that
govern marriage, residence, custody over children and inheritance (Kerr 2005a).
Traditionally, matrilineal systems of descent involve inheritance through the
mother’s side and the mother gains custody of children as well as land on divorce.
Matrilocality is common, where the husband moves to the wife’s village after
marriage. Matrilocality implies that a husband is removed from his primary source of
power: his kin (Reniers 2003). Should the couple divorce, the husband leaves the
wife’s village with nothing; local narratives say that the man should “leave with his
blanket” (Reniers 2003, p. 180). Patrilineal systems are based on descent through the
father’s side and patrilocality is common, where the wife moves to the husband’s
village after marriage. Men keep land on divorce, so that patrilineal women who
divorce are unable to earn a living without remarrying.7
Under patriliny, wives’ outside options are low. As a result, the incentives to
divorce are limited. The desperation of patrilineal wives in Malawi to assume any
kind of control within marriage is well-documented by Kerr (2005a). The wives
interviewed often claimed husbands were “harsh” (Kerr 2005a, p. 71) and not ready
to share more of their cash income with the household. Although the cash income
was inadequate, they felt that they had no power to change the situation. Excessive
usage of alcohol was also observed in the community studied by Kerr (2005a), which
affected the ability of husbands to provide labor and was a cost on scarce resources.
Alcohol was the most frequently cited cause for marital conﬂict. The case of one
husband is documented, whose wife stopped cooking for him due to his excessive
drinking; this is an example of the type of incentives explored in this paper.
In contrast, women in matrilineal families have high outside options, as a result of
which husbands are often more supportive. Saﬁlios-Rothschild (1982) describes the
6 There are nine main ethnic divisions or tribes (Spring 1995). The matrilineal tribes are the Chewa,
Nyanja, Mang’anja, Lomwe, Tonga and Yao. The patrilineal tribes include the Ngonde, Ngoni and
Tumbuka. In addition, the less common Senga and Sena are patrilineal.
7 The rules of each kinship system are not always strictly upheld: matrilineal couples may end up settling
down patrilocally and individuals may inherit land, regardless of kinship. Generally, however, patrilineal
couples are more likely to marry patrilocally and the wife is less likely to inherit land from her natal kin,
compared to matrilineal couples.
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strong kinship support offered to women in matrilineal communities, which leads to
high female autonomy. Anthropologists acknowledge that marital ties are weaker in
matrilineal societies (Peters 1997), potentially because the bond between a matrili-
neal sister and her brother is stronger and more loyal than the bond between the sister
and her husband. Indeed, Walther (2016) shows that, on average, 12 % of matrilineal
households were headed by a divorced adult in 2011, in contrast to only 8 % of
patrilineal households. Matrilineal husbands need to work hard to avoid divorce:
while the husband is seen by his wife’s kin as a “work-horse,” he may gain the
respect of the family and community if he is hard-working (Phiri 1983, p. 260). Since
divorced women lose any cash support from their husbands, they will only divorce if
this support is inadequate.
3 A model of moral hazard in rural households
Consider a husband and wife who like to consume a private good that is bought with
wages earned by the husband, and a public good which is the output of the wife’s
domestic labor. The husband decides how much effort to make at work. If he makes
low effort, denoted e= 0, he earns one unit of income with probability q −Δ, and
nothing otherwise. If he makes high effort, e= 1, this probability increases to q, but
he incurs a private utility cost ψ. The wife cannot observe effort directly, which
generates a moral hazard problem. However, she can observe his income, which is a
noisy signal of his effort.
The husband’s income is split between husband and wife for the purposes of
private consumption: if he earns one unit of income, he consumes α units and she
consumes 1 − α. In the baseline model, I assume for simplicity that this sharing rule is
predetermined. In Section 3.3, I show that my main predictions are robust under
reasonable conditions even when the sharing rule is endogenous.
Having observed income, the wife faces two choices. First, she decides whether to
divorce her husband or stay married.8 Second, if still married, she chooses to exert
effort l∈ [0,1] on domestic labor at a private utility cost γ per unit. Domestic labor is
a public good that provides utility λ> γ per unit for each partner, which is propor-
tional to the amount of domestic labor supplied. Let uh and uw denote the husband’s
and wife’s utility in divorce.
For simplicity, I assume that preferences are linear and separable in private
consumption, public goods and the cost of effort. Thus the husband’s and wife’s
utility in marriage are
uh ¼ α q Δð1 eÞð Þ þ λl ψe
uw ¼ ð1 αÞðq Δð1 eÞÞ þ λl γl
I focus on the case where Δα< ψ<Δ, which makes moral hazard salient: under
this condition, it is efﬁcient for the husband to make high effort, since this improves
expected aggregate consumption, but he has a private incentive not to do so.
Moreover, assume that λ> uh and λ γ  uw, so that, in principle, it is inefﬁcient to
8 I assume a no-fault divorce system.
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divorce because the beneﬁts of sharing a public good exceed the couple’s joint
outside option.
As a benchmark, consider the ﬁrst-best scenario where the husband’s effort is
veriﬁable. The couple can sign a binding contract, where the husband commits to
making high effort. It is efﬁcient in this case for the couple to stay married and for the
wife to provide domestic labor l= 1, independently of income. The resulting level of
household welfare is
W ¼ qþ 2λ ðγ þ ψÞ
When effort is unobservable, it is no longer possible to write a contract which
forces the husband to provide for the wife. The couple now faces a second-best
problem. The husband cannot commit directly to make effort, and the only way in
which he can be incentivized to do so is through her actions: the threat of divorce or
of withholding domestic labor if the husband’s income is low. I now consider
optimal incentive contracts based on these threats in order to obtain empirical
predictions.
Before deriving optimal contracts, it is useful to discuss two assumptions of the
baseline model. First, I have assumed that the wife can observe the husband’s income
before making her divorce and labor supply decisions. If she cannot observe his
income before making her decisions, then she cannot incentivize the husbands to
make effort. However, incentive contracts can easily be recovered by recognizing
that marriage is a repeated game. Suppose, for instance, that the timing is reversed
but the game is repeated twice, at dates 0 and 1. Then incentivze can be provided by
divorcing or withholding domestic labor at date 1 if the husband’s income at date 0 is
low. The optimal contracting considerations below would be unchanged. In this
sense, my predictions are robust to timing assumptions. Second, as is common in the
moral hazard literature, I assume that the wife can commit to these threats. In
Section 3.2, I argue that these threats are likely to be credible when there are repeated
interactions.
To ﬁnd the optimal incentive contract, note that there are three options: The wife
can incentivize the husband by threatening to reduce domestic labor, by threatening
to divorce, or she can decide not to incentivize him at all. Suppose ﬁrst that the wife
commits to reduce domestic labor to l= 1 − x if the husband does not earn income.
The husband will make effort as long as the incentive constraint Δ(λx + α)≥ ψ holds.
Assume that Δ(λ + a)≥ ψ, so that it is possible in principle to satisfy this constraint.
The least distortive incentive contract is obtained when the incentive constraint just
binds. The resulting household utility is
Wdomestic ¼ W  ð1 qÞð2λ γÞx
¼ W  ð1 qÞ ψαΔΔ  2λγλ
Welfare is lower than in the ﬁrst-best case, because the wife withholds domestic
labor whenever income is low, even if the husband has made effort. In other words,
the incentive contract introduces a distortion by punishing the husband for bad luck
when he earns low income. The surplus lost is (1 − q)(2λ − γ)x: the probability of low
wages times the lost surplus from x units of domestic labor in this state.
Suppose now that the wife commits to divorce the husband with probability d if he
does not earn income. Then the husband will make effort as long as
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Δ½dðλ uhÞ þ α  ψ . Again the least distortive contract sets d just big enough to
satisfy the incentive constraint, and the resulting household utlity is
Wdivorce ¼ W  ð1 qÞð2λ γ  uh  uwÞd
¼ W  ð1 qÞ ψαΔΔ  2λγu
huw
λuh
Welfare is still lower than in ﬁrst-best, because divorce is inefﬁcient. The surplus
lost is again intuitive: low wages arise with probability (1 − q), and in this case the
couple pays the deadweight cost of divorce 2λ γ  ðuh þ uwÞ with probability d.
Finally, suppose that the wife does not seek to incentivize the husband through
domestic labor or divorce. Then he will make low effort and the resulting household
utility is
W0 ¼ W  Δ
Let us focus on the case where the probability of earning wages q is high enough,
and where the cost of low effort Δ is high enough. In this case, it pays to incentivize
the husband, since W0<max{Wdomestic, Wdivorce}. In particular, the optimal contract
involves the withdrawal of domestic labor if and only if
uw
uh
<1 γ
λ
2 ð0; 1Þ ð1Þ
Domestic labor is a better incentive device than divorce, as long as the ratio of
outside options uw=uh is small. Intuitively, a low outside option uw means that
divorce is very disruptive for the wife, so that using domestic labor to provide
incentives is preferable. Conversely, a high outside option uh means that divorce is
not a strong deterrent from the husband’s perspective, again implying that domestic
labor is a better way to provide incentives. Notice, in particular, that if wives are
better off upon divorce than husbands ðuw > uhÞ, then (1) cannot hold, and divorce
will necessarily be the optimal incentive device.
3.1 Empirical predictions
The model above generates empirical predictions for the relationship between
domestic labor, the private consumption of wives, and outside options. In particular,
condition (1) suggests that the correlation between domestic labor and female private
consumption is either zero or positive, and that this correlation will be more positive
in samples where wives are relatively worse off after divorce, in the sense that their
relative outside option uw=uh is lower.9
The contribution of this paper is to test these predictions in the context of Malawi.
I exploit the coexistence of matrilineal and patrilineal tribes in Malawi to obtain
exogenous variation in the relative outside option uw=uh. Under patriliny, wives are
relatively worse off after divorce because men tend to own most of the household
9 Female private consumption is a sub-category of household private consumption, and is the simplest way
of seeing whether the woman has beneﬁtted from the husband’s labor supply. Household private con-
sumption will depend on how much cash the husband has earned for himself, which may not be subject to
the same theoretical or empirical predictions: it is not clear that the wife would reward or punish the
husband for cash that he has earned for himself.
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land, which has two effects: on the one hand, patrilineal wives can bring fewer assets
into a new marriage and thus ﬁnd it harder to re-marry after divorce. They also lose
access to land, and production associated with it, if they remain single. These factors
imply that uw is lower in patriliny. Section 4.5.3 examines attitudes to divorce by
descent type and provides supporting evidence for this. On the other hand, husbands
in patrilineal regions will ﬁnd it easier to re-marry, and keep access to land if they
remain single, so that uh is higher in patriliny. Both effects work in the same
direction: the wife’s relative outside option is lower in patriliny, and it is, therefore,
more likely that domestic labor will be used as an incentive device instead of divorce.
This reasoning yields my central prediction:
Proposition 1 The correlation between wives’ provision of domestic labor and their
private consumption is positive and higher for patrilineal than for matrilineal
households.
I can exploit two further pieces of information about outside options within kin-
ship systems to obtain further predictions. First, patrilocal households are those
residing in the husband’s village of origin, which is likely to decrease the wife’s
relative outside option compared to matrilocal households. Second, the wife’s rela-
tive outside option is higher when she has inherited some land from her family.
These facts yield an additional prediction:
Proposition 2 Within kinship systems, the correlation between wives’ provision of
domestic labor and their private consumption is higher for patrilocal than matrilocal
households, and lower for households where the wife has inherited land than other
households.
In Section 4, I take these predictions to the data. In the remainder of this section, I
discuss the robustness of the theoretical predictions when (i) the wife cannot commit
to threats of divorce or low domestic labor, or (ii) the sharing rule for private
consumption is endogenized, as well as the robustness to alternative mechanisms
such as changes in cooperation or complementarities between domestic labor and
consumption.
3.2 Commitment
If the wife cannot commit to incentive mechanisms, then there is a question of
credibility: when divorce or withholding domestic labor is inefﬁcient ex post, the
wife might be tempted to renege on the incentive mechanism.
In reality, married couples interact repeatedly over time, and repeated interactions
can alleviate concerns about credibility. One way of formalizing this notion is to
assume that the wife wishes to maintain a reputation for being tough in the sense of
Kreps and Wilson (1982). Suppose that the model above is repeated N times and that
the wife is one of two types: with probability p, she is tough and has an intrinsic
desire not to cooperate with a husband who brings home low wages. With probability
1 − p, she is weak and her preferences are as in the baseline model.
A tough wife will punish the husband whenever he earns low wages, either by
divorcing him if her outside option is high, or by withholding domestic labor if her
outside option is low (thus the predictions above go through for strong wives by
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assumption). Kreps and Wilson (1982) show that if the time horizon N is long, and if
the future is not heavily discounted, then weak wives will also punish their husbands
for earning low wages in equilibrium. This is because a wife who does not punish
reveals herself to be weak, and loses the ability to incentivize her husband in all
future periods.
A model of reputations is not the only way to generate commitment. One alter-
native is to think of marriage as an inﬁnitely repeated game with imperfect
information, as in Green and Porter (1984). Then, there could be an implicit
agreement to withhold domestic labor for a few periods, or to end the marriage, if the
husband earns low wages. These strategies will enforce high effort, with
predictions similar to those in the static model, as long as discount factors
are sufﬁciently high. Finally, one could think of marital contracts as a reference point
in the sense of Hart and Moore (2008). In this setting, the reference point would
be for the wife to expect to be provided with private consumption, giving
her an incentive to ‘shade’ her performance on domestic labor if this expectation is
not met.
In all of these cases, incentives are credible, even when wives are not committed
to enforcing them. Thus, the predictions of Propositions 1 and 2 remain valid.
3.3 Sharing rule
In the baseline model, the husband always receives a share α of his income. If we
drop the assumption that this sharing rule is ﬁxed, a natural way to incentivize effort
would be to give the husband more ‘skin in the game’ by increasing his share of
private consumption to α′> α if his income is high. In particular, a higher share
would give the husband the right incentives as long as Δα′≥ ψ.
This incentive mechanism can, in principle, be more efﬁcient than distorting
domestic labor supply or getting divorced. However, it requires that utility from
private consumption is easily transferable from wife to husband; i.e. that the
aggregate utility from private consumption does not fall substantially when a larger
share is allocated to the husband. If moral hazard is a severe enough problem, this is
unlikely to be the case. Suppose, for instance, that the wife has a subsistence level of
private consumption c0, below which her marginal utility of another unit of con-
sumption is very high. Then if moral hazard is severe enough, such that 1 − ψ/Δ< c0,
the husband can never be incentivized using the sharing rule without pushing the
wife below her subsistence level, which is prohibitively costly.10 In this situation, the
optimal incentive must involve either the withdrawal of domestic labor or divorce
(possibly alongside a small change in the sharing rule). Thus, the qualitative pre-
dictions of Propositions 1 and 2 would be unchanged.11
10 The example of subsistence utility is very stark, but the intuition generalizes easily. Suppose more
generally that the utility derived from consumption is a concave function u(c). The cost of allocating a
larger share of private consumption to the husband is  ddα u αð Þ þ u 1 αð Þ½  ¼
R α
1α u
00 cð Þj jdc: As long as
the curvature of utility |u″(c)| is sufﬁciently large, it will not be feasible to give the husband too big a share
of his income without introducing considerable distortions.
11 A similar situation could occur if there is a high subsistence level of domestic labor. In this case, it
would not be possible to simultaneously satisfy all constraints and meet the subsistence level, and so the
domestic labor mechanism would not be implementable.
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3.4 Alternative mechanisms: complementarities and cooperation
I now explore two alternative mechanisms, which might be expected to generate
similar predictions to Propositions 1 and 2.
First, suppose that domestic labor and private consumption are complementary, so
that the maginal utility from domestic labor is λ if the husband’s income is high, but
only λ0< λ if it is low. The interesting case is when 2λ0< γ, so that it is no longer
efﬁcient to provide domestic labor in case of low income. The ﬁrst-best scenario is
now (i) for the husband to make high effort, and (ii) for the wife to provide domestic
labor if and only if he earns high income. The husband now has strong incentives to
make effort, even in the absence of punishment: if he does not earn high income, the
wife optimally stops providing domestic labor and the husband loses utility λ, on top
of his loss of private consumption α. Thus, he will make high effort voluntarily and
the household is able to achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome so long as Δ(λ + α)≥ ψ. (This
is the same condition which I imposed above to ensure that domestic labor is a
feasible incentive device.) In this case, moral hazard ceases to be a problem.
It follows that with complementarities, the correlation between private con-
sumption and domestic labor can be positive, even if there is no moral hazard
Table 1 Sample characteristics
by lineage
Matrilineal Patrilineal P-values
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Age (in 2004) 36.66 44.31 35.59 42.47 0.34 0.17
(0.72) (0.88) (0.85) (0.99)
Secondary
school educated
(%)
0.01 0.09 0.10 0.27 0.00 0.00
Rumphi (%) 0.01 0.83 0.00
Mchinji (%) 0.42 0.12 0.00
Balaka (%) 0.57 0.06 0.00
Land (acres) 1.71 3.27 0.81 5.49 0.00 0.17
(0.18) (0.38) (0.13) (1.56)
Poor (2004,%) 0.17 0.09 0.02
Poor (2006,%) 0.06 0.01 0.02
Patrilocal (%) 0.50 0.88 0.00
Wife has land
inheritance (%)
0.61 0.14 0.00
Clothes ‘04
(‘000MWK)
0.31 0.91 0.73 1.13 0.00 0.62
(0.04) (0.39) (0.14) (0.20)
Clothes ‘06
(‘000MWK)
0.80 1.15 0.79 1.07 0.92 0.67
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15)
N 200 138 338
Standard errors in parentheses
P-values test whether patrilineal households are signiﬁcantly different
from matrilineal households
S. Walther
problem. Thus, the ﬁrst prediction of Proposition 1 can be generated by com-
plementarities alone. However, this model does not yield the remaining predictions
of Propositions 1 and 2. If there is no moral hazard problem, then outside options do
not affect optimal choices, unless there are signiﬁcant differences in household
preferences—in particular, in the strength of complementarities—across kinship
systems and between matrilocal and patrilocal households.
Second, suppose that in the baseline model, the wife’s private cost of providing
domestic labor exceeds her private beneﬁt, γ> λ. If the husband’s effort and the
wife’s labor supply were chosen as part of a non-cooperative game, then both of
them would choose to shirk, setting e= l = 0. By contrast, the cooperative outcome
would be e = l= 1, because both partners’ activities generate spillovers to the other
person. If we thought of the family as playing an inﬁnitely repeated game,
where deviations from the cooperative outcome are punished by reversion to non-
cooperation, we might expect to see the cooperative outcome in young households,
Table 2 Time use by gender
and lineage
Matrilineal Patrilineal P-values
Women Men Women Men Women Men
2004
Domestic 3.83 0.19 3.93 0.11 0.58 0.21
(0.13) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04)
Leisure 12.16 13.03 12.08 14.55 0.80 0.00
(0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.33)
Economic 2.46 6.59 1.99 4.62 0.13 0.00
(0.21) (0.31) (0.23) (0.35)
Cash labor 0.68 2.86 0.49 1.57 0.38 0.00
(0.15) (0.31) (0.13) (0.26)
Other 5.05 3.83 5.78 4.62 0.02 0.04
(0.18) (0.24) (0.25) (0.30)
2006
Domestic 4.28 0.29 3.48 0.10 0.00 0.01
(0.14) (0.06) (0.15) (0.03)
Leisure 11.56 12.73 11.04 11.93 0.04 0.01
(0.19) (0.20) (0.17) (0.24)
Economic 2.67 6.04 3.88 6.54 0.00 0.27
(0.21) (0.27) (0.29) (0.34)
Cash labor 0.66 2.84 0.38 1.49 0.13 0.00
(0.13) (0.28) (0.12) (0.24)
Other 5.47 4.70 5.07 4.34 0.19 0.35
(0.19) (0.23) (0.25) (0.31)
N 200 138 338
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values test whether patrilineal
households are signiﬁcantly different from matrilineal households
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followed by occasional breakdowns in cooperation. This mechanism would generate
a positive correlation between domestic labor and private consumption. In order to
generate the additional predictions of Propositions 1 and 2, however, it would be
necessary to argue that changes between cooperation and non-cooperation are less
likely in matrilineal households, so that on average, the correlation between
domestic labor and consumption is lower for this group. This implies that matrilineal
households are mostly cooperative, or mostly uncooperative, whereas patrilineal
households often transition between the two. The key point is that this necessarily
also implies that both domestic labor and cash income are on average either higher
or lower among matrilineal than patrilineal households, which Tables 1 and 2 show
is not the case. Thus, differences in cooperation are unable to simultaneously
generate the predictions in Propositions 1 and 2 and to explain the empirical results.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Identiﬁcation
To test Proposition 1, I use a ﬁrst-difference analysis to examine the effect of a
change in consumption on the change in wife’s domestic labor supply. This over-
comes the problem that the particular levels of labor supply in a household cannot be
identiﬁed as high or low. It also avoids the issue of constant omitted variables that
affect labor supply.12 To differentiate between whether or not the divorce threat
mechanism is in use, I rely on the fact that kinship is an exogenous determinant of
outside options in Malawi. Matrilineal women have high outside options, while
patrilineal women have low outside options. The difference between these outside
options is assumed to be large enough such that the ratio in equation (1) holds on
average for patrilineal women but not matrilineal women. As a result, I expect to
observe more stringent domestic labor incentives by patrilineal women than matri-
lineal women.13
I assume that labor supply is a linear function of its determinants and formulate
a ﬁrst-difference regression equation. I estimate the equation with a full set of
interaction dummy variables for kinship, which effectively means that the
equation is estimated separately for patrilineal and matrilineal households. Let-
ting M be a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is matrilineal and zero
12 One such variable is bargaining power, which is likely to affect both consumption and labor supply.
Bargaining power is unlikely to vary across time in rural Malawi because it is primarily a function of land
ownership, which is determined at marriage. Land purchases are rare and most land changes hands through
inheritance. An alternative source of bargaining power, savings, are minimal in rural Malawi (see Walther
2016).
13 Variation in kinship may not only reﬂect variation in outside options, but also variation in other factors
that affect consumption and domestic labor, such as effort or productivity. However, in the present sample
there are eight tribes, four of which are matrilineal. Therefore, any characteristic that varies with kinship
must hold for all four tribes: for example, that four of the tribes are simultaneously harder working than the
other four and also matrilineal. This characteristic also needs to cause consumption and domestic labor to
increase together. This is unlikely and I assume that it is not the case here.
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otherwise, I estimate
Δli ¼ αþ αMMi þ βΔCi þ βMMΔCi þ θΔXi þ θMMΔXi þ Δεi ð2Þ
where there are i= 1,…,N households, Xi is a vector of control variables, Δli= li,t
− li,t − 1,ΔCi=Ci,t − Ci,t − 1,Ci,t is the wife’s private consumption level in period t,
ΔXi=Xi,t −Xi,t − 1 and Δεi= εt − εt − 1.14 The model predicts the following:
β> 0
β þ βM < β
The ﬁrst inequality implies that patrilineal wives respond positively with their
domestic labor to increased consumption. The second inequality implies that this
response is smaller for matrilineal wives than patrilineal wives.
To measure outside options more accurately, I also take into account marital
residence. Patrilocal women have lower outside options than matrilocal women, so
that a particularly strong response should be observed for patrilineal-patrilocal
women and a particularly weak response for matrilineal-matrilocal women.
To measure the wife’s domestic labor, I use the number of hours the wife spent on
domestic activities (cooking, cleaning and doing laundry) during the previous regular
working day. For the wife’s private consumption, I use the amount of money spent
on the wife’s clothing, fabric for clothing and shoes in the past three months. The
possible reverse causality between labor and spending is addressed by the fact that
the reported spending covers a period of time prior to the time diary, namely the
preceding three months. Further, labor supply in itself is easier to adjust than
spending, because spending requires ﬁrst an adjustment of labor supply in order to
earn the required income for additional spending (or a reduction in labor supply
leading to reduced income and thus spending). Therefore, it is conceivable that
spending in the last three months reﬂects husbands’ efforts to earn cash one to four
months ago. This alleviates concerns about reverse causality.
The control variables in X are spending on husband’s clothing, fabric for clothing
and shoes in the past three months, land assets (to control for outside options), the
average clothes spending of wives in the village (to control for income-earning
opportunities), the health status of the spouses, a dummy variable indicating whether
the interviewer perceives the house to be poor, household size and the total number
of hours accounted for by the wife in her time diary. Further details of all variables
are given in Appendix A.
In order to properly identify the divorce threat mechanism, one would need to
examine those couples who divorce in matrilineal marriages. Divorce should be
negatively correlated with consumption. However, the data does not allow this test
because most of the couples who divorce leave the sample and this cause of attrition
is not distinguished from migration or death. As a result, I interpret the matrilineal
marriage as the baseline scenario, with the patrilineal marriage a special case of that,
namely when divorce is not accessible.
There may be plausible alternative stories that explain the results. In addition to
the theoretical analysis of alternative mechanisms in Section 3, I carry out several
14 Most of the married couples in the sample are of the same lineage. A small proportion are mixed
lineage; for those, I use the lineage of the wife.
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robustness checks empirically: I examine the impact of clothes spending on leisure
and other time use categories in the main results and I take into account land
inheritance, district- and district-descent-speciﬁc labor shocks and heterogeneity of
responses. I also examine respondents’ viewpoints on divorce to provide further
evidence on the difference in outside options across kinship types, as well as ana-
lysing respondents’ attitudes to domestic violence to show that husbands cannot
counteract low domestic labor with violence.
4.2 Data
The data comes from the Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health, con-
ducted by the University of Pennsylvania in partnership with the College of Medicine
and Kamuzu College of Nursing in Malawi. Although not constructed to represent
the national population, characteristics of the sample are close to those observed in
the rural sample of the Malawi Demographic and Health Survey. A roughly equal
number of people were interviewed in the three districts of Rumphi (North), Balaka
(South) and Mchinji (Centre). The sample consists of ever-married women between
the ages of 15–49 in each district and their husbands. I use the 2004 and 2006 survey
waves.15After restricting the sample to those households interviewed in both years
and those that satisfy some basic criteria, the ﬁnal sample consists of 338 house-
holds.16 Time use data was collected using a time diary with half-hour intervals,
where individuals selected one out of 40 possible activities. Spending on clothing is
measured based on the answer to the question: “In the past 3 months, approximately
how much did you spend in total on clothes, fabric for clothes or shoes for yourself?”
As three months is a relatively long recall period, we might expect random mea-
surement error in the answers to this question. In this case, the coefﬁcient on
women’s clothing could suffer from attenuation bias, so that the true effect is larger
than what is found in the empirical results.
Two potential sources of sample bias are addressed: general attrition and the
exclusion of those couples who divorce between 2004–2006 but remain in the
sample. Sample attrition between the two waves does not exhibit strong patterns.
When comparing those who leave the sample after 2004 with those who do not, few
differences in basic characteristics are found. Those who remain in the sample but
report being divorced, separated or having a new spouse are small in number but
similar on basic characteristics. Men who divorce or remarry tend to be poorer.
Divorce or remarriage is more likely in matrilineal settings, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that matrilineal women use divorce threat more than patrilineal
women. In addition, clothes spending is lower on average in 2004 for those who
divorced or remarried after. Thus, poor consumption outcomes are correlated with
higher divorce rates, which is also consistent with the theoretical framework.
15 The data used in the study are for the 2003–2004 and 2005–2006 agricultural seasons, with interviews
taking place during the dry season. Agricultural production in these two seasons was normal (Takane 2008;
Denning et al. 2009).
16 I exclude polygamous households, households where the husband is ordinarily resident elsewhere and
households where the months of the interviews in 2004 and 2006 were more than two months apart. This is
to avoid confounding factors relating to labor patterns across the agricultural year.
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4.3 Summary statistics
Some characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 1. I focus on differences
across lineage, as this is an exogenous variable. In terms of basic characteristics,
education is higher in patrilineal marriages, both for wife and husband. This is
because the patrilineal North has a more developed education system, the legacy of
religious missionaries in colonial times (Reniers 2003). The regional differences are
obvious; while 57 % of matrilineal marriages are in Balaka, only 1 % are in Rumphi.
Both the amount of land owned and whether a woman has inherited land support the
key premise for identifying the mechanism, which is that matrilineal women have
signiﬁcantly better outside options than patrilineal women.
Patrilocality and inheritance are strongly correlated with lineage. While 88 % of
all patrilineal marriages in the sample are patrilocal, only 50 % of matrilineal mar-
riages are. This suggests that matrilineal couples have some ﬂexibility in location
upon marriage, whereas patrilineal couples do not. Similarly, 61 % of matrilineal
women have inherited land, in contrast to 14 % of patrilineal women.
Next, I examine the division of labor (Table 2).17 There is strong evidence that
women hold a monopoly over domestic labor. They spend around four hours on
domestic work on average per day, while their husbands spend less than half an hour
on average. Men tend to spend more time on economic labor than their wives. In
particular, they spend signiﬁcantly more time on cash labor than their wives, on
average. These observations are consistent with the division of labor described in
Section 3. The average hours of domestic labor increase for matrilineal women
between 2004 to 2006, so that in 2006, matrilineal women spend signiﬁcantly more
time on domestic labor than patrilineal women. One might be concerned if patrilineal
women’s domestic labor increased between the two periods, along with an increase
in their average spending on consumption goods. This could lead to spurious cor-
relation. However, since we are expecting matrilineal wives to use weaker incentives
than patrilineal wives, this increase in average domestic labor is unlikely to explain
the regression results. The increase is likely driven by an unobservable shock, and I
control for district-speciﬁc and district-descent-speciﬁc shocks in the robustness
checks. Further, I control for any changes in the average values of labor supply in the
regressions by including a dummy variable for being matrilineal, as well as the
difference in the total hours reported in the diary between the two periods.18
4.4 Regression results
In order to test Proposition 1, I estimate equation (2) by regressing the change in
domestic labor from 2004 to 2006 on the change in wives’ clothes spending, with a
full set of interaction dummies for kinship. Table 3 shows the value of the coefﬁ-
cients of interest for the ﬁrst set of regressions. Full results are in the Online
Appendix.
17 See Appendix A for the activities included in each category.
18 The summary statistics also show that there is a large enough range in hours of domestic labor for it to
be a reliable incentive device. In 2004, wives’ domestic labor ranged from 0 to 10.5 hours per day. In 2006,
it ranged from 0 to 11 hours per day.
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Regression (1) shows that an additional 1000MWK (~£1.60) spent on patrilineal
wives’ clothing in the last three months results in about ten more minutes of
housework per day.19 Matrilineal wives have a weaker response: their marginal
increase per 1000MWK is only three min. This supports Proposition 1. I also report
the estimated value of βM, which the model predicts should be negative. This is
indeed the case, although the coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. One possible alternative explanation of the results is that greater clothes
spending is correlated with being better off, which results in a reduced need for farm
labor and thus an increase in domestic labor. However, regressions (2) and (3) show
that there is a clear substitution for both kinship types from leisure into domestic
labor: leisure falls signiﬁcantly for patrilineal wives and the difference in labor
supply changes in (3) is highly signiﬁcant. On the other hand, the sum of the
differences in (4) is not signiﬁcant for either kinship type, which shows that there is a
substitution between domestic labor and leisure.20 Regression (5) demonstrates that
there is no effect on economic labor for patrilineal or matrilineal households. This
supports the idea that the observed change in domestic labor is an active incentive
device, rather than an income effect.
Next, I test Proposition 2 by dividing the households further by marital residence, as
this is likely to have a strong impact on a woman’s outside option. In particular,
patrilineal-patrilocal women have the lowest outside options, so that condition (1) is
most likely to be satisﬁed, while matrilineal-matrilocal have the highest outside options,
so that this condition is least likely to be satisﬁed. Regressions (6)–(10) in Table 4
demonstrate these results. Patrilineal-matrilocal marriages are rare in Malawi; in the
present sample there are only 17 households of this type, so I leave the result for this
group to the Online Appendix. The hypothesis that women with low outside options
respond more strongly to changes in consumption than women with high outside
options is supported here: while patrilineal-patrilocal women increase their domestic
labor by a highly signiﬁcant 12min per day in response to a 1000MWK increases in
Table 3 The effect of consumption on labor by lineage
ΔConsumption (1) ΔDom (2) ΔLeis (3) ΔD−ΔL (4) ΔD +ΔL (5) ΔEcon
Patrilineal ðβ^Þ 0.159** −0.292** 0.451*** −0.134 −0.162
Matrilineal ðβ^ þ β^MÞ 0.053* −0.004* 0.058** 0.049 0.081
N 338 338 338 338 338
R2 0.136 0.148 0.134 0.160 0.085
Value of β^M in regression (1): − 0.105 (P-value 0.495)
***Denotes signiﬁcance at 1 % level, **at 5 % level and *at 10 % level. For the sum of two coefﬁcients,
signiﬁcance corresponds to an F-test on the joint signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients
19 The summary statistics show that clothes spending is ~1000MWK on average. Therefore, an increase
by this amount represents a doubling of clothes spending.
20 This substitution effect also counters the idea that we are observing increasing returns to specialization
—the more domestic labor a woman does, the higher the efﬁcient level of her domestic labor (and similarly
for income generation for the husband). In this case, the wife would substitute out of economic labor into
domestic labor and not out of leisure.
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clothes spending, the response of matrilineal-matrilocal women is negligible. The value
of β^M for the matrilineal-matrilocal group supports Proposition 1: it is negative and
signiﬁcant, with a P-value less than 5%. This suggests that this particular group
responds more weakly to increases in consumption than the patrilineal-patrilocal group.
The response of matrilineal-patrilocal woman is inbetween these two, which is con-
sistent with the idea that their outside options are intermediate.
Regression (7) demonstrates that leisure falls signiﬁcantly for patrilineal-patrilocal
and matrilineal-matrilocal wives. In particular, the absolute value of the coefﬁcient
for patrilineal-patrilocal wives is similar in regressions (6) and (7), showing a sub-
stitution effect. This is conﬁrmed in regression (8), which shows that the difference
between domestic labor and leisure increases by 30 min for patrilineal-patrilocal
wives. Regression (9) conﬁrms that this is a substitution effect, as the sum of the two
differences is not signiﬁcant. The clearest effect of consumption on a substitution
from leisure into domestic labor is seen for patrilineal-patrilocal wives, who are the
least empowered group in Table 4. There is no effect on economic labor for patri-
lineal-patrilocal wives; in contrast, matrilineal-matrilocal wives exhibit a strong
positive response of economic labor to spending, suggesting that they may be playing
a role in earning cash.
These results conﬁrm that ﬁrst, the domestic production mechanism exists, and
second, that there is more reliance on it in marriages where wives have low outside
options. The latter hypothesis is conﬁrmed in an apparent way, with highly sig-
niﬁcant and positive coefﬁcients on spending for marriages where women have low
outside options and coefﬁcients close to zero where women have high outside
options. Taking into account marital residence demonstrates that being surrounded
by kin is a crucial factor that increases a woman’s outside option in Malawi.
The results signify some important conclusions. Matriliny and its implications for
land rights and marital residence are sources of empowerment for women. They do not
have to rely on inefﬁcient sources of power within marriage, such as domestic labor, to
encourage their husbands to work hard. In contrast, women with low outside options are
not able to divorce if their husbands do not provide cash income. Instead, they are left
with little leverage aside from their role in the domestic sphere. Making divorce easy
and fair is a key pathway towards improving female autonomy. A particularly potent
way of achieving this is by granting land rights to women.
Table 4 The effect of consumption on labor by lineage and residence
ΔConsumption (6) ΔDom (7) ΔLeis (8) ΔD−ΔL (9) ΔD +ΔL (10) ΔEcon
Plin-Patrilocal (N= 120) 0.195*** −0.288** 0.483*** −0.092 −0.200
Mlin-Patrilocal (N= 99) 0.090** 0.185* −0.095** 0.276 −0.314
Mlin-Matrilocal (N= 101) 0.007*** −0.345* 0.352* −0.338** 0.617**
N 337 337 337 337 337
R2 0.147 0.168 0.148 0.185 0.100
Value of β^M (Mlin-Mloc) in regression (6): − 0.189 (P-value 0.019)
“Plin” stands for Patrilineal, “Mlin” stands for Matrilineal and “Mloc” stands for Matrilocal
***Denotes signiﬁcance at 1 % level, **at 5 % level and *at 10 % level. For the sum of two or more
coefﬁcients, signiﬁcance corresponds to an F-test on the joint signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients
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4.5 Robustness checks
In order to verify the robustness of the empirical results, I examine land inheritance
instead of descent, allow for heterogeneous responses by various characteristics,
allow for district-speciﬁc and district-descent-speciﬁc shocks to labor as well as
examine attitudes to divorce and domestic violence.
4.5.1 Land inheritance
Land inheritance is arguably a more important determinant of outside options than
descent, as it more accurately captures whether a spouse can survive economically on
divorce. Thus, I interact descent with whether the wife owns land or not to provide a
more accurate measure of outside options, which is also a test of Proposition 2.
Table 5 orders marriages in terms of accessibility of divorce, with divorce being least
accessible for patrilineal-no land wives and most accessible to matrilineal-land
wives. The results conﬁrm that the extent to which women increase their domestic
labor in response to spending is correlated with the accessibility of divorce.
Regression (I) demonstrates a highly signiﬁcant, positive response of domestic labor
to spending for patrilineal-no land wives, who work an additional 12 min per day in
the home when they receive an additional 1000MWK of clothes spending. This is
larger than the effect for all patrilineal wives in regression (1), suggesting that no land
inheritance makes divorce even less accessible. The effect for matrilineal-no land
wives is positive and signiﬁcant but smaller, which is consistent with the idea that
divorce is more accessible to women in this type of marriage. The effect for
matrilineal-land wives is close to zero, which is again in line with the predictions of
the theoretical framework. This is supported by the value of the coefﬁcient on β^M ,
which is negative, although not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.21
The robustness of these results for patrilineal-no land wives is conﬁrmed in
regressions (II)–(V). There is a clear substitution from leisure into domestic labor for
patrilineal-no land wives. While leisure falls by nearly 20 min per day, the difference
Table 5 The effect of consumption on labor by lineage and land inheritance
ΔConsumption (I) ΔDom (II) ΔLeis (III) ΔD−ΔL (IV) ΔD +ΔL (V) ΔEcon
Plin-NO land (N= 118) 0.209*** −0.286** 0.495*** −0.076 −0.214
Mlin-No land (N= 77) 0.104*** −0.085 0.189** 0.020 −0.233
Mlin-Land (N= 123) 0.024** 0.037 −0.013 0.061 0.297
N 338 338 338 338 338
R2 0.145 0.155 0.144 0.166 0.093
Value of β^M (Mlin-Land) in regression (I): − 0.186 (P-value 0.329)
“Plin” stands for Patrilineal, “Mlin” stands for Matrilineal
***Denotes signiﬁcance at 1 % level, **at 5 % level and *at 10 % level. For the sum of two or more
coefﬁcients, signiﬁcance corresponds to an F-test on the joint signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients
21 As with marital residence, I omit the result for the Patrilineal-Land group in this table, of which there
are only 20 households in the sample. The result is in the Online Appendix.
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between domestic labor and leisure increases by a highly signiﬁcant 30 min per day.
The sum of the differences in regression (IV) is not signiﬁcant, conﬁrming a sub-
stitution effect. There is no effect of spending on economic labor. These results are
consistent with those of the previous section and thus lend further support to the
framework in Section 3.
4.5.2 Heterogeneous responses and district-speciﬁc shocks
In this section, I look for heterogeneous responses to changes in women’s labor. In
particular, there may be differential responses based on the characteristics of the
household, such as poverty, land holdings and number of children. In speciﬁcation
(a) in Table 6, I interact the change in domestic labor with the change in the
household’s landholdings and add this to regression (1). Compared to the coefﬁcient
in regression (1) in Table 3, the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient on patriliny strengthens
and the magnitude of the coefﬁcient increases. Thus, the results are robust to a
heterogeneous response by landholdings. The coefﬁcient on the change in land size
interacted with change in domestic labor is positive (result not shown); this suggests
that where consumption outcomes and land holdings both increase, wives spend even
more time on domestic labor. If an increase in land holdings captures an increase in
household wealth, then this is consistent with the moral hazard framework of
Section 3. In speciﬁcation (b), I include the change in the poverty status of the
household interacted with the change in domestic labor. Again, the results do not
change. In speciﬁcation (c), the change in the number of children in the household is
interacted with the change in domestic labor, once again producing no change in the
coefﬁcients on patrilineal and matrilineal domestic labor responses. Thus, the results
of the previous section are robust to accounting for heterogeneous responses by
changes in characteristics such as land, poverty and number of children.
Another concern regarding the estimates in the previous section may be that there
are district-speciﬁc shocks to labor. Recalling that the households are sampled from
three different districts in Malawi (out of a total of 28 possible districts), I include
district indicator variables in regression (d) in Table 6. These allow average changes
in labor supply to vary across districts. The result shows that the magnitude of the
coefﬁcient on patriliny does not change in a signiﬁcant way, although it becomes
Table 6 Heterogeneous responses and district-speciﬁc shocks
ΔConsumption (a) +ΔLand
*ΔDom
(b)+ΔPoor
*ΔDom
(c) +ΔChildren
*ΔDom
(d) +District (e) +District
*matrilineal
Patrilineal ðβ^Þ 0.203*** 0.158** 0.178** 0.136* 0.126*
Matrilineal
ðβ^ þ β^MÞ
0.111** 0.058* 0.076** 0.080 0.069
N 338 338 337 338 338
R2 0.143 0.137 0.140 0.146 0.148
***Denotes signiﬁcance at 1 % level, **at 5 % level and *at 10 % level. For the sum of two coefﬁcients,
signiﬁcance corresponds to an F-test on the joint signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients
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slightly less signiﬁcant. Building on this, I also include district indicator variables
interacted with the matrilineal indicator variable. This allows for any district-descent-
speciﬁc shocks to labor. This is speciﬁcation (e), where again there is no signiﬁcant
difference to the coefﬁcient on patriliny. Thus, the results are robust to allowing for
district-speciﬁc and district-descent-speciﬁc shocks to labor.
4.5.3 Attitudes to divorce
An examination of attitudes to divorce can help substantiate some of the assumptions
that drive the interpretation of the results. In particular, a key assumption of the
identiﬁcation strategy is that matrilineal women are more able to divorce than
patrilineal women. This is the reason why the former do not need to rely on within-
marriage sources of power as much as the latter. By examining attitudes to divorce in
the face of husbands who do not provide ﬁnancial support for their families, evidence
for this assumption can be provided. In particular, husbands and wives were asked
whether it is acceptable for a woman to divorce her husband if he does not provide
for her or her children ﬁnancially. In the Online Appendix, I provide the mean values
of responses by lineage, marital residence and land inheritance. I describe the ﬁnd-
ings here. Overall, 53 % of matrilineal women feel that they are able to divorce men
who do not provide, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the ﬁgure of 17 % for patri-
lineal women. Divorce is also most acceptable among matrilineal-matrilocal women
(57 %) and least acceptable for patrilineal-patrilocal women (16 %). A similar pattern
is found when examining land inheritance: divorce is most acceptable for matrilineal
women with inheritance (59 %). These observations are consistent with the regres-
sion results, where the strongest responses of domestic labor to consumption were
observed for women with the lowest outside options.
An implicit assumption of the framework is that husbands cannot force their wives
to behave in a certain way: they cannot use violence, for example. One way of testing
this is to examine attitudes to violence in marriage. Respondents were asked whether
it is acceptable for a woman to leave her husband if he beats her often. Most women
report that they think it is acceptable to leave their husbands if they are violent, and
there are no signiﬁcant differences across kinship types. I ﬁnd that 87 % of matri-
lineal women and 83 % of patrilineal women feel able to leave their husbands if they
are violent. Therefore, it is unlikely that men can counteract the use of domestic
production as an incentive device with violence.
5 Conclusion
This paper has explored whether domestic labor is used by wives as an incentive
device in marriage. A moral hazard model of marriage in Malawi was derived, where
the husband provides a rivalrous consumption good and the wife provides a public
good. In addition, the wife may divorce the husband following a bad level of the
consumption good. The existence of divorce threat acts as an additional source of
incentives to encourage the husband to invest high effort. The model yielded the key
prediction that wives with high outside options use less stringent domestic labor
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incentives than wives with low outside options. This led to the hypothesis that in
Malawi, patrilineal wives increase their domestic labor more in response to increases
in their clothes spending than matrilineal wives.
By examining the effect of wives’ clothes and shoes spending on their domestic
time use in a ﬁrst-difference estimation strategy, the Proposition of the model have
found strong support. Patrilineal wives increase their domestic labor by 10 min per
day when they receive an additional 1000MWK of clothes spending. This effect is
stronger than the effect for matrilineal wives. Patrilineal wives who are also patrilocal
exhibit an even stronger effect, with the strongest effect for patrilineal wives with no
land inheritance (12 min). The robustness of the results is conﬁrmed by regressions
on other time use variables, which show a clear substitution between leisure and
domestic labor for wives with low outside options and no effect of changes in
consumption on economic labor. I also verify that the results are robust to hetero-
geneous responses and district- and district-descent-speciﬁc shocks to labor. Through
questions on attitudes to divorce, the key assumption that divorce is more accessible
to women in matrilineal communities is supported. In addition, attitudinal responses
show that most women would leave a violent husband, which suggests that women
are freely able to manipulate their domestic labor.
The results imply that when divorce is not accessible, women rely on domestic
labor as leverage within marriage. On the other hand, when divorce is accessible, this
leverage device is less needed. Since using domestic labor as leverage results in an
inefﬁcient allocation of time, the accessibility of divorce should be encouraged in
policy. One way of achieving this in developing countries is to grant women land
rights, which give them ﬁnancial security following divorce.
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Appendix A
Variables
The following table gives details of the variables used in the regressions.
Variable Data
Domestic Number of hours spent on cooking, cleaning and washing clothes during the previous
regular working day
Leisure Number of hours spent on sleeping, community and village work, political meetings,
religious activities and other leisure activities during the previous regular working day
Economic Number of hours spent on ﬁeld preparation, ridging, planting, transplanting, fertilizing,
weeding, harvesting, animal care, gathering vegetables and other operations, wage
labor, group ﬁeld labor, salaried employment, sales, handicraft and alcohol production,
transporting goods, metal work, basket weaving, carpentry, charcoal preparation, water
collection for sale and other cash activities. during the previous regular working day
Other Number of hours spent on school attendance, eating, childcare, visiting friends,
collecting water and ﬁrewood, repairing the house and farm, attending funerals, caring
for the ill (2006 only) and sex (2006 only) during the previous regular working day
Clothes Amount of money spent on wife’s clothes, fabric for clothes or shoes in the past 3
months
Clothes_villmean The mean of the variable Clothes in the village
Land The total amount of land the household owns, in acres
Husbclothes Amount of money spent on husband’s clothes, fabric for clothes or shoes in the past 3
months
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